The annj of Price was, at this time, variously estimated at from 10,000 to 40,000. It was certain that he had a large force. Curtis appealed to Halleck for additional troops. His ai*my eould not number in the field over 8,000 men, and would be still further redueed by post garrisons and other causes, so that upon reaching Springfield it would fall far short of the rebels in numbers. Halleek expressed the oi^inion that Price would evacuate Springüeld on the approach of the Federal army. The authorities at "Washington, he wrote, were pressing him to send troops elsewhere, and but few, if any, could be spared. The Division of Davis was ordered to march from Otterville to the Osage, there to remain as a reserve, unless absolutely needed in the field. It was then intended to seTid thia Division elsewhere, but subsequently, upon urgent solicitations, and representations of the importance of additional troops, and the uselessness of a reserve so remote from an impending battle, joined with the inertness of Price before the advance of the Federal forées, indicating a disposition to maintain his position, the consent of Halleck was given to its march to Springfield.
EoUa was established as a base of operations, and Captain M. P. Small, Commissary of Subsistence, was placed in the management and charge of all supplies for the army at that point, Captain P. H. Sheridan being Chief Quartermaster of the army in the field. Major William H. English, of the 4th Iowa Infantrj', was stationed at EoUa as Chief of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, and rendered very effective service in that capacity.
Major Norton P. Chipman, of the 2d Iowa Infantry, had first acted as Chief of Stafi' to General Curtis at EoUa, but, by order of Halleck, he was returned to his regiment, as being of too high rank to serve on the staff of a Brigadier General, and his place was then supplied in the field, first by Adjutant Thomas Irvin McKenny, of the same regiment. After the arriv.il of the army at Lebanon, and subsequeutly in the field, the staff of Curtis was augmented by the addition of Captains Henry Z. Curtis, Assistant Adjutant General, Wiliiam H. Stark and John Ahlef'eldt, of the Missouri Volunteers, aidsde-camp, Lieuteuaut John W. Noble, of the 3d Iowa Cavalry, Judge Advocate, and other worthy and competent officers.
On January 14th commenced the advance of the infantry. Two battalions of cavalry and three infantry regiments under Colonel P. J. Osterhaus, were ordered to proceed to Waynesvüle. On January 17th, "Phelps' Missouri Eeginient," under Colonel John S. Phelps, and on January 22d, the 4th Iowa, 24th Missouri and 35th Illinois infantry regiments, and the 1st Iowa Battery, under Col. G. M. Dodge, of the 4th Iowa, were also ordered forward. The 9tli Iowa Infantry, Dubuque Battery, and Major William D. Bowen's Missouri Cavalry (which had returned from Carr), were directed to move on the 26tli. Captain John W. Stephens, Company "A," of Bowen's Battalion, was placed in charge of a battery of mountain howitzers before again taking the field.
The infantry experienced great difficulty in moving forward. The coldest part of the seasou was the time selected for the advance. No great depth of snow fell at any time during tlie campaign, but the frosts were severe, and the roads, traversing an extremely broken and hilly country, were alternately deep mud and rough, frozen ground. The crossings of the Gasconade River, Big and Little Piney, and other streams, were difficult. A pontoon train had been asked from St. Louis, but it could not be obtained.
At Waynesville, Carr assumed command of the troops. After a brief rest, the whole force of infantry, cavalry and artillery at Waynesville was ordered forward and reoccnpied Lebanon. Cui'tis was averse to* taking the field in person until it became necessary. "The movement of Generals to the front," he said, " always attracted the enemy's attention and gave him alarm. It was inexpedient to do this so long as it could be avoided."
At length, on January 26th, 1862, Cmtis, with one staff officer. Lieutenant McKenny, set forward in person. After four days' cold, comfortless travel, crossing Gasconade River twelve miles from Rolla, and going by the northern or " Union " road, avoiding Waynesville, he arrived in Lebanon on the 29th, and established his headquarters in an old twostory* frame house in the edge of the town, with one room in a habitable condition, his staff and military family camping in the yard.
The troops at Otterville, constituting the old 2d Division of Fremont's Army of the AVest, principally composed of Indiana troops, and under command of Colonel Jefferson V. Davis, of the same State, had been ordered by Halleck to move to the Osage, to be used, if possible, only as a reserve supporting the army advancing upon Springfield. But the necessity of a further advance of this division became appar. ent, and it was ordered to move to Lebanon, now the rallying point for the army. Crossing the Osage Eiver at Lynn Creek, the command of Davis arrived at and encamped three miles west of Lebanon, and Davis reported himself ready to move at once on Springfield.
Sigel was absent in St. Louis when Curtis left Rolla. Upon his return, the troops remaining under his coin"i"'^'i ""rl uuder Asboth, were ordered to Lebanon. The 13th Illinois Infantry and Major S. N. Wood's Battalion of Cavalry were left as a garrison at Rolla, Colonel Wyman still commanding that post. The roads had already been rendered almost impassable from the movements of troops and trains. The mud betweeu Rolla and the crossiug of the Gasconade, for a distance of twelve miles, was very deep, aud many teams were " stuck," vainly struggling to extricate themselves. Asboth moved slowly, taking the Waynesville road, and was followed next day by Sigel, who crossed the Gasconade, moving by the northern road, and bringing up the rear with the last troops from Rolla. The troops were urged forward to avoid the dauger of swollen streams. Reports of their progress through mud, frost and suow were daily received, and at length all the army was concenti-ated at Lebanon.
The advance from Rolla had been delayed to the last moment by HaUeck, in order to ascertain the disposition of the War Department. A rapid advance was now urged. The campaign in Tennessee had actively commenced. Fort Henry was captured. " I leave Price to you," wi'ote HaUeck toCurtis, '• I have Johnson. Polk, Beauregard and Ilardce to deal with."
The troops had advanced to Lebanon by tlu'ee routes : one, south of the Gascouade, crossing the streams of Little and Big Piney, to Waynesville, and there crossing the Gasconade ; another, the northern, or, as it was called, the " Union " road, crossing the Gasconade twelve miles from Rolla, and moving on the north bank ; another, from Otterville, on the northern branch of the Pacific Railroad, far north and west of the routes from Rolla, via Lynn Creek, crossing the Osage. By moving upon differeut roads, the troops were enabled to advance with greater rapidity, over roads not previously worn and rendered so difficult of passage by travel ; greater supplies of forage were obtained, and the enemy was the lens able to P.78
estimate the force and count the troops moving against him. A similar arrangement was subsequently adopted for the advance on Springfield. The advance pickets on the Springfield road were under command of Lieutenant Colonel Clark Wright, about fourteen miles from Lebanon. Wright was an old resident of southwestern Missouri, and very familiar with the country and people. He establi.shed a system of scouts and spies to ascertain the movements and condition of the enemy. He reported to Curtis that he had six different lines of communication direct with Springfield. His spies were known only to himself, and were unknown even to each othei'. This was necessary to their safety and the perfection of his system. There were additional means of receiving information trom Springfield, through Colonel Phelps, through spies who reported directly to the commanding General, and through other sources.
The news received through these various sources was somewhat contradictory. In substance it was nearly as follows:
A rebel cavalry force occupied Marshfield, and worked the mill for the rebel army. The enemy's pickets were frequently seen by ours, fourteen miles from Lebanon. Wright made a dash on Marshfield, with cavalry, capturing a large amount of fiour. The rebels returned in search of this fiour.
Price, with his whole force, was in Springfield, and manifested no signs of retreating. The particular locality of his camps and pickets was accurately described. He had received a reinforcement of artillery and a valuable supply train. The term of enlistment of many of his men was expiring, and ho had issued a call for volunteers for fourteen days. This brought him no great reinforcement, but he remained quiet, and appeared fully determined to contest his position. He had selected various battle grounds : one, on the level prairie north of Springfield ; one, on the old ground at Wilson's Creek, where he had already sent his artillery, &c. His Generals were Frost, McBride, Rains, Slack, Parsons and Stein.
On the contrary, it was asserted that he had caused sup-plies of eorn to be hauled and deposited at the distances of each day's march on the entire route to Arkansas. He had erected no ñold defenses or fortifications at Springfield, and seeession families throughout the country were making hasty preparations to depart. From these, and various other facts, it was inferred that he intended to ev.ieuate. It was even reported that he had practiced the r-me of moving his troops around Springfield, and (causing them to enter from another direction,) marching them through the town as reinforcements, to create an appearance of greater strength.
But it was satisfaetorily ascertained that his force numbered from eight to ten thousand men, with some seventy pieces of artillery. It was reported that Tan Dorn would soon join him with large reinforcements, and assume command. The prevention of this junction was an additional reason for an immediate advance, without waiting for additional troops which had been promised. " Beware of Tan Dorn," wrote Halleck, " he is a wary and energetic officer."
In the quartermaster's department, the scarcity of funds had been a serious embaiTassment. Pay for supplies, forage, &c., had not been promjjt, but Capt. Sheridan here reeeived forty thousand dollars, which greatly aided the forward movement. The difficult state of the roads and the inclement weather had rendered the hauling of supplies from Rolla a great trouble. Mills at all available points were put in müi-tary use, and furnished a supply of fiour and meal from graiu procured from the adjoining eountry. Fresh meat was very abundant, and in consequence of the last fact, and the seareity of bread-stuifs and salt meat, a change in the ration was ordered, reducing the allowance of flour and doubling the • allowance of fresh meat, with an ample allowance of corn meal. At Lebanon the " Ai-my of the South-West " received its organization. The troops were arranged in four divisions. The 1st division was placed under the direct command of Gen. Sigel, wlio subsequently assigned the command to Col. The several divisions were eacli divided into two brigades. The command of the brigades was assigned by division commanders, as follows :
u Gen. Franz Sigel was an officer of European distinction, and had early and constantly taken an active and distinguished part in the war in Missouri. He was in command at RoUa when superseded by Curtis, and his position was now that of second in command.
In speaking of the relative merits of Curtis and Sigel, the writer hopes to avoid any display of undue partiality to either. While he regards Curtis as being throughout the leader aud director of this south-western campaign, he has ever felt a sincere admiration for, and high appreciation of the peculiar talents and distinguished services of Sigel. In the conduct of either geueral, he never saw any of the smallness of envy and personal jealousy sometimes manifested by partizans, or attributed to them by shallow newspaper writers and correspondents. During the continuance of Sigel with the army, their personal intercourse was cordial and that of gentlemen, and their relations such as were appropriate betweeu the chief aud second in command.
Sigel was a thorough soldier, quick of perception, ready of movement, although not perhaps so mueh a director aud great general, fitted to manoeuvre a large army in the field, as an active and daring leader, suited to sudden movements, forays, or the manoeuvi'ing of a division in the immediate presence of the enemy. His skill in conducting a retreat is proverbial.
The general of an army in the field, occupying a hostile or rebellious territory, is required to possess qualifications beyond those of the soldier. The power to imderstand and queU factions among the people ; to dispel rebellion and conciliate a conquered country, to discriminate between those who would be friends, and those whose concealed sentiments are iu opposition to the conqueror, to continue in force appropriate local laws, and in civil office men suitable to the emergency, to make conquest itself as light a burden as possible, at the same time enforcing the rule of the conqueror, and ohtaining all the real objects of subjugatiou, require statesmanship, political knowledge, and a deep insight into human nature. To provide for the sustenance and safety of a large army, remote from its base of operations, to master the details of army business and see that they are in the hands of appropriate men, to guard against danger with a cool deliberation and forethought, to know the force, condition and position of an enemy, to be ready to strike him at the right moment, and to prevent him from surprising, defeating or capturing detachments, or tlie whole army, are some of the qualities which mark the general. Curtis possessed these qualifications in a high degree. He had been long in public life, and in addition to his military education at West Point, in Mexico, and in the great rebellion, he was eminent as a business man, a lawyer, a politician, and a statesman. The management of the army of the South-west as an army in the field, during the entire eampaign, was done by him through his division commanders and other agents.
We are not required, from any of the events of this campaign, to presume that Gen. Sigel was lacking in any of these or other necessary qualifications. But no opportunity offered, during his connection with the Army of the South-West, which called for the exercise, on his part, of any degree of talent, beyond his position as second in command. There can be no presumption against his ability to have conducted the campaign with the most perfect success ; but he had no occasion to display such ability. Commanding two of the four divisions of the army, under the orders of his superior officer, until after the battle of Pea Ridge, he was compelled by sickness to go to St. Louis, from whence he never returned to the south-west, being ordered for duty elsewhere. The ungenerous and unjust attempts, made by mistaken partisans, to give to Sigel the honors of the campaign, were, with the true spirit of a gentleman aud a soldier, as will be hereafter seen, by him expressly denied and disclaimed. Curtis, guided and controlled by Halleck alone, conducted the campaign, manoeuvred the several divisions and various detachments of the army, commantled in the eountry, and is entitled to whatever 68é , ANNALS OF IOWA.
[.ICLV, of credit may be due to the General who won the victory of Pea Ridge, and first successfully planted tbe federal flag on the soil of rebellious Arkansas. Col. P. J. Osterhaus was an old German soldier and an excellent officer. At the commencement of the rebellion, he was a clerk in the commercial house of Pomeroy and Benton in St. Louis. To enable him to support his family, his salary as clerk was eontinued after he had entered the military service as a non-commissioned officer. He soon rose to the rank of Colonel, and when Curtis arrived at Rolla, he had long had command of a brigade. He had led the first infantry on this expedition to Lebanon. Being a great favorite with Sigel, the latter assigned him to the command of the 1st division, and when Sigel subsequently left the army, Osterhaus was continued in eommand, and was, on the recommendation of Curtis, promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General while in Ai'kansas. General A. Asboth was an exued Hungarian patriot and soldier, having originally eome to the United States with Kossuth, and remained as a citizen. He was a brave and chivalrous gentleman, of a kind and noble disposition. The commonest soldier with whom he had intercourse, met with the most considerate politeness. He was known throughout the army by his huge iron-grey moustaehe and side whiskers, and by the blanket of camel's hair, with large and slightly faded black and white stripes, which he wore on all occasions in lieu of an overcoat. He was generally aecompanied by a large and noble dog of the St. Bernard species. Personally brave and an excellent ofiicer, he yet seemed to lack self-confidence. He was disposed to magnify coming dangers, and entertain doubts of his own ability to overcome them.
Col. Jefiferson C. Davis, of the 22d Indiana Infantry, was an ofScer of the regular army. He had seen service in Mexico, and at the commencement of the rebellion was a Lieutenant, and one of the immortal band that surrendered with Anderson at the fall of Fort Sumter. He brought a division from OtterviUe to the Army of the South West. Tl.is was afterwards the 3d division of the army. He was a brave officer, and a thorough and efficient soldier, not given to boasting but prompt in execution.
Col. Eugene A. Carr belonged to the regular cavalry service before the war. He was made Colonel of the 3d Illinois Cavalry, and was the ranking officer of cavalry at EoUa, when Cm'tis assumed command. He was therefore placed in command of the cavalry expedition towards Springfield. The importance of this undertaking, and the efficient manner in which he had performed his duties, entitled him to the command of a division. The bloody record of his command at Pea Eidge, and his courage elsewhere shown, attest the gaUantry of this officer. At Pea Eidge, repeatedly wounded, he held the field for hours against the rebel's strongest force, in a manner which furnishes suificient evidence of his ability and personal coui'agc.
But, like Asboth, he was extremely cautious. He advised against the advance on Springfield, saying it was useless to thrice recapture a point we might not hold ; and after its capture, he feared that his troops were not in a condition to pursue Price. At Pea Eidge, while performing his duties in the most gaUant manner, and against the strongest odds, his appeals to the commanding General for reiaforcements were most frequent, and his doubts of his ability to hold the field, great. At Little Red Eiver, in Ai'kansas, he was the strongest opponent of a fiirther advance on Little Eock, constantly nrging many reasons why the attempt must fail, and for the impracticability of maintaining our then present position.
In this quality of cautiousness, both he and Asboth were the reverse of Sigel. No words of doubt ever came fi-om the latter in advance of the trial. His boldness was extreme, and ever prompted him to hazardous and separate undertakings. This adventiu-ous disposition was viewed with uneasiness by the Depai-tment c.)mmander. " Beware of detached movements," wi-ote HaUeck to Curtis ; " remember that Sigel's detour lost the battle of Wilson's Creek."
Besides division commanders, may be cited the names of a few of the more prominent and particularly distinguished, or Avho have since become known to fame.
Frank J. Herron, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 9th Iowa Infantry, a captain at Wilson's Creek, in the 1st Iowa Infantry, three months' volunteers; taken prisoner at Pea Ridge, and exchanged, with others, for Col. Hebert and Maj. Tunnard, of Louisiana ; since a Major-General ; one of the heroes of Prairie Grove, commanding General of the " Army of the Frontier," and distinguished in the south-west ; a fine-looking, talented and gallant officer, and, when promoted, one of the youngest of our Generals.
John B. Wyman, Colonel of the 13th Illinois Infantry, commanding the post of Rolla; a good-hearted, brave and efficient officer, much given to profanity, and very popular with liis regiment. He had early entered the service, and felt extremely sore on account of never having been made a Brigadier General. His regiment was one of the best disciplined in the service, and although not present at Pea Ridge, fought nobly at Vicksbura-, in Sherman's first assault, where Wyman fell.
Colonel John S. Phelps, of " Phelps' regiment," Missouri Infantry, six months' volunteers ; an old politician, a resident of Springfield, and, at the time. Congressman from the Springfield District; since.Military Governor of Arkansas. He was the triend of Lyon, and the corpse of the latter had been interred in his yard subsequent to the battle of Wuson's Creek. In common with the men of his regiment, he was an exile from home and family, in south-west Missouri.
Colonel Sempronius H. Boyd, of the 24th Missouri Infantiy, or " Lyon Legion," commonly called " Pony Boyd ;" a slight, boyish-looking man, also a resident of Springfield ; since Congressman from the Springfield District, and one of the most radical of Missouri anti-slavery politicians. He was especially useful from his knowledge of the topography of the country, and the character of the south-western people. Like Phelps, he and his regiment were exiles from the south-weBt.
Captain Philip H. Sheridan, of the 13th U. S. Infantry, was ordered by Halleck to report to General Curtis as Chief Quartermaster. Upou arriving at RoUa, he found his department in a very disorganized state ; but with great energy he went to work and soon produced a change infinitely for the better. To his efforts was in a great measure due the ability of the army to make its rapid march into the enemy's country.
When the army had advanced into Arkansas, a great scarcity of mules and horses began to prevail. Transportation over the long line of communication became difficult, and the troops were suffering from want of supplies. Curtis directed Sheridan, then at Springfield, to use every effort to obtain animals ; if necessary, they were to be seized, wherever fouud, and pressed into the service. Sheridan then held very conservative views of the war and its causes. He objected to this mode of procuring stock. He would not, he wrote, engage in "jayhawking," and requested to be reUeved from his duties. The language of his letter was disrespectful aud iusubordinate, and he was aecordingly ordered to report, uuder arrest, to the Chief Quartermaster at St. Louis, and the duties of Chief Quartermaster of the army were devolved upon Captain F. S. Winslow, an officer who filled the position with great ability. But " Phil. Sheridan " was not destined to remain in obscurity. He was almost immediately made Chief Quartermaster on HaUeck's staff, at Corinth ; next. Colonel of the 1st Michigan Cavalry ; and next promoted BrigadierGeneral, and serving with distinction under Rosecrans, in Tennessee. It is not necessary here to say more of one who has since become one of the nation's best and favorite Generals.
There were also Colonel Grenville M. Dodge, of the 4th Iowa Infantry, and brigade commander in the 4th divisionsince a Major-General, distinguished in northern Mississippi, Alabama and the West, and an energetic and very useful officer ; Col. WiUiam Vandever, of the 9th Iowa Infantry, brigade commander in the 4th division, and at the time a Con-gressman from Iowa, and a prominent Iowa politician-since a General ; Col. Nicholas Greuisel, of the 36th Illinois Infantry, an old and able soldier ; and also the subsequently promoted Generals, Cj'rus Bussey and T. I. McKenny, of Iowa; W. P. Benton, of Indiana; George E. Waring, of Missouri ; and Powell Clayton, of Kansas.
HISTORY OF DAVIS COUNTY, IOWA, CHAPTER IV.
[C'mtinueU from pago 65S.] I'KLNTING PKESS.
It has been said ' that Printing Presses, Pulpits and Petticoats are the three great levers that govern the world. This we have no disposition to dispute, even if we doubted its truth, for all good citizens (and we claim to be one among that class, if not one of them,) must admit that without the ladies there would be but little use for pulpits, as there would be wanting one of the greatest attractions usually found at the churches ; and without pulpits there would be a want of religion and morality. But as it is our purpose merely to give a brief sketch of the history of the Press in our town, it must not be expected of us to remark further upon the Pulpit, or to enlarge upon the infiuence, the sunny smiles, and tender affections of the better half of creation which has been cast about the rugged pathway of the sterner sex of Davis during his onward com'se to fame and to glory. The infiuenee of the Press upon every branch of trade, every profession, and even the morals of the people is too well known and understood to requii-e a single remark in this connection. But the Printer., that "chap" who makes the newspaper, we are inclined to think is a more singular fellow then he is generally thought to be. It is true that many people are aware that he lives without eating, and that he never wears out any clothes, foi' they have been regular
